Study Yevamot folio 7B with parallel Hebrew-English text, traditional commentary, and modern study tools. Free access to Babylonian Talmud online.
Therefore, the verse states: “As the sin-offering…so is the guilt-offering” (Leviticus 7:13), to teach that just as the sin-offering requires placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the altar, so too, the metzora’s guilt-offering requires placement of the blood and sacrificial parts on the a
The Talmud comments: And had the verse not explicitly restored this case of guilt-offering to its generalization, I would say: With regard to that which was excluded from the generalization as a novel ruling in this case, it was excluded, and with regard to that case which was not excluded, it was
§ Rather, the suggestion that other women with whom sex are usually forbidden might be permitted for levirate marriage was based on a different argument: It might enter your mind to say: Let this claim be derived by the hermeneutical principle of: What do we find with regard to, which is a principl
The Talmud wonders about this: Is it comparable? How can one case be derived from the other? There, in the case of a brother’s wife, only one prohibition has been permitted, the prohibition with regard to a brother’s wife, whereas here, we are dealing with two prohibitions, both a brother’s wife
And from where do you say that we state this reasoning of: Since it is permitted, it is permitted? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a metzora whose 8th day, on which he becomes ritually pure from his tzara'at and brings his last offerings to the Temple, occurs on the eve of Passover, and